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Cross-listing has been a popular strategy for business expansion and seems always to be 
followed by appreciation in firm value. Previous theories explain the existence of this stock 
premium either due to risk reduction, by committing and then providing better protection to 
minority shareholders and by improving information environment and media coverage, or due to 
growth opportunities, by raising capital for potential growth projects and by reducing the cost of 
capital among a larger investor base. This paper aims to connect stock premium with one of the 
firms’ aptitude, called default probability, and testing whether this relationship is statistically 
significant in several regression models. 47 Canadian firms from 10 major sectors and 38 
industries are selected, which announced officially their cross-listing activities in NYSE or 
NASDAQ during 1982 to 2002. The financial data are collected from Datastream to measure 
firm specific factors and cross-sectional models are applied to capture the sector specific factors.  
It is reasonable to conclude that pre-listing premium and firm size account mostly for the post-
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Purpose of the Study 
The majority of promising firms from foreign countries have cross listed their stocks in the U.S. 
market to partake in a booming market and to reap potentially a large listing premium. This is 
suggestive that cross-listing in international markets, especially the U.S. market is followed by 
both gains in wealth and reputation. To be specific, cross-listing in the U.S. market requires a 
more open and transparent corporate culture, an internationalized management mode, abundant 
growth opportunities, confidence and determination with stringent scrutiny and disclosure 
standards. In addition, listing will provide protection for the rights of minority investors in 
international markets. However, there are trade-offs and costs accompanying the cross-listing are 
significant. Not only do the companies have to meet certain standards in accounting reporting, 
but also they must be prepared to accept cultural shocks, media attention and the knowledge that, 
in the process of accepting international capital funds, foreign investors may know very little 
about the companies. Apart from balancing the advantages and disadvantages surrounding cross 
listing, there is a causality puzzle: what makes a huge stock premium possible? For example, is it 
an aptitude companies already possess that gives rise to the up-valuation of stocks listed in 
international markets. 
The factors include superior company qualifications, such as positive accounting information 
(revenue and its growth potential), earning signals, developments and innovation in patents and 
technology, efficient corporate governance and growth opportunities. These will all influence 
company values after the event of a cross listing. However, cross listing may expose inherent 




This paper aims to explore the influence on the cross-listing by one of the company aptitudes 
called default probability. The analysis in this paper will attempt to explain why cross listing 
usually creates extra value to most of the companies.  
1.2 Background 
With the great internationalization of developed capital markets, cross listing has been a popular 
strategy for firm expansion and value enhancement, while there are also tremendous obstacles 
that firms have to tackle before they are fully recognized in international markets. Those 
obstacles have not deterred potential candidates, especially from emerging markets. They make 
great efforts to meet the entry standards and get their stocks cross listed. While investors 
understand that financial analysts and policy makers know the potential for value appreciation 
from cross-listing, what is not fully understood is where the extra value comes from. The 
question then arises that if cross-listing can increase value for most of the firms, does that mean 
that weak companies can fool international investors and somehow pass the scrutiny of the 
marketplace? If so then there is an incentive for them to try everything to obtain a cross–listing. 
Otherwise, there are reasons behind the occurrence of extra value increase that strong companies 
generate by cross listing their stocks outside of their domestic markets.  
Harmful medium-long term effects for both the companies and investors may lead to a 
reputational issue for other firms seeking cross-listing  If, however, investors accept that the 
blindness of pursuit in cross-listing might be harmful for firms not financially solid, they will 
perform due diligence and invest wisely, vouching that it is more likely that those promising 
companies with better growth potentials and lower probability for default will enjoy higher 
appreciation in firm value after they successfully cross list.  
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1.3 Need for the study 
In order to determine the factors that better and more fully account for the increase in firm value 
after cross listing, this paper aims to test the explanatory power of relevant variables that might 
contribute to the existence of such a stock premium. Previous academic theories, concerning why 
cross listing makes a firm worth more are mainly done by Doidge et al., (2004), and Sarkissian 
and Schill (2010). This paper will add another explanatory variable to measure the default 
probability of firms before any influences of cross listing involved. If this additional variable 
shows a statistically significant relationship with the dependent variable, the cross listing 
premium, it may offer another perspective to understand cross listing. Indeed, by focusing on the 
importance of the core value of firms themselves, it might deter many weaker firms from 
incurring the costs of seeking a transnational listing. 
1.4 Outline of study 
This paper is structured as follows. Chapter 2 will demonstrate briefly and concisely the 
comprehensive literature concerning cross listing. Chapter 3 will focus on the methodologies 
employed by various authors and will contrast their similarities and differences. In consideration 
of the benefits of these similarities, this paper will choose one particular methodology as a basis 
on which then to offer a model consistent with the literature, but with improvements. Chapter 4 
will present the data used, regression analysis and interpretation of the results to provide an 
empirical perspective for understanding the subject issue. Chapter 5 will provide conclusions, 




Chapter 2: Literature Review 
This chapter provides a review of the literature where the cross listing activity is interpreted from 
various aspects of foreign or minority investors, company controlling shareholders, analysts and 
other public followers and market regulators. Most previous work explains the reasons for cross 
listing and verifies these causalities by conducting regression tests for sample firms from various 
industries globally, and by using dummy variables as a facility to indicate the year that cross-
listing occurred, across different countries with differing regulations and legal systems. 
2.1 Cross listing and private benefits 
It is generally known that private benefits take a particular form as capital committed by 
minority investors but controlled by managers of firms arbitrarily. However, several other 
interpretations can also make sense. According to Jensen (1993), the existence of an implicit 
contract provides managers of firms with the power to engage in wasteful expenditures, which 
often get unnoticed because minority shareholders have no idea that they are actually the check 
payers. Besides, private benefits include management entrenchment (Shleifer and Vishny, 1989). 
For instance, a manager may abuse his power to divert resources from optimum allocation to 
particular projects for stabilizing his discretionary authority, rather than maximizing the wealth 
of general shareholders. 
Not surprisingly, a cross-border listing usually happens in an established market where 
enforcement of laws is efficient and private benefits committed by financiers are well protected 
(La Porta et al., 1997). From the perspective of minority investors, their involvement in foreign 
contribution of capital depends highly on the degree of guarantee that their money will be used 
productively and they can be made aware of any misconduct if managers privately take 
possession of the capital instead. Firms’ cross listing rescues minority shareholders from their 
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disadvantaged positions of losing protection by obeying the same regulations that these investors 
are familiar with.  From the perspective of minority shareholders, the prohibition of 
misappropriation is considered a heavy burden for firms which have lacked discipline in 
honoring their responsibilities in domestic markets. Firms will only agree to give up these private 
benefits when the rewards they gain from external capital internationally is larger relative to the 
amount of the private benefits they forgo (Benos and Weisbach, 2004).  
According to Dyck and Zingales (2004), firms will minimize their international financing 
activities if they can enjoy private benefits at home. Consequently, this may have the effects of 
slowing down the development of domestic equity markets given that the financing channels are 
aimed at international markets, especially U.S. market.  
An alternative way to understand protection to private benefits is taking it as a kind of agency 
cost. This encumbrance to controlling shareholders is too hard to remove that they are more 
likely to do not list in the U.S. since the eradication of expropriation is demanding (Doidge et al., 
2004).    
2.2 Cross listing and information efficiency  
According to Karolyi (1998), the disclosure requirements of cross listing reduces the extent of 
information asymmetry between firms’ insiders and outsiders and promotes market convergence. 
The issue of information asymmetry is also resolved by the participation of financial analysts, 
auditors, consultants and media reporters whose primary tasks are taking full advantage of these 
messages pervasive in the market (Benos and Weisbach, 2004), which will also improve the 
information environment in the whole market. It seems that cross listing channels the 
qualitatively internal information to international investors and this kind of signalling pattern 
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generates higher valuation in the equilibrium state afterwards (Moel, 1999; Benos and Weisbach, 
2004). 
The study of Lang et al., (2003) shows that appreciation in firm value takes place during window 
periods around cross listing. That is probably because the information environment in the market 
is enhanced thanks to transparent coverage and the precise forecasting of followers. As a result, 
many undervalued firms finally realize their fair values for investors. The credibility of the 
commitment, and then efficiency in the information market, are backed by irreversible 
implementation of cross listing subsequently, even though firms find out that suspension of cross 
listing before they start or delisting after they cross listed are optimal 
 Logically, there is a cycle, combining two inverse relationships, behind this: increased firm 
disclosure reduces the cost of coverage, and, in turn, the low agency costs lead investors to gain 
value and to prevent unexpected events in the market (Lang and Lundholm, 1996). The positive 
fruits by prediction are achieved by investors nationally and internationally who are willing to 
commit capital when they are satisfied with firm disclosure (Lins et al., 2000). 
2.3 Cross listing and bonding hypothesis 
Foreign equity financing is essential to launch projects with a positive Net Present Value (NPV) 
when internal equity and bond issue are costly. Therefore, Stulz (1999) has argued that 
controlling shareholders of the firms intend to acquire trust emotionally and fund materially from 
minority shareholders by aligning with them together because firms also may learn advanced 
technology and more effective business administration. One approach to establish the bonding 
relationship is to promise the protection to investors by cross listing stocks on a reliable 




There are several ways of cross-border listing on the U.S. market, either listed directly on NYSE 
or NASDAQ or indirectly through an American Direct Deposit (ADR), with full registration 
with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to protect shareholders’ rights (Doidge et 
al., 2004; Reese and Weisbach, 2001).  
As mentioned above, the bonding relationship gains persuasive powers for firms and facilitates 
their popularity enhancement. Extra equity offerings after cross listing would be a predictable 
behaviour for firms facing difficulties in local financing with fragile protection to minority 
shareholders. It is also conceivable that the high similarity between the protection level in 
domestic markets and foreign markets will not relate to extensive offerings unless the expansion 
into foreign market is more of a priority than raising funds. (Benos and Weisbach, 2004; Reese 
and Weisbach, 2001).  
Based on the further test of Doidge (2004) on dual-class firms, the tightness of the bonding 
relation affects the voting premium by up to forty percent for exchange-traded cross listing, such 
as ADR Level 2 & 3, and, on the other hand, affect neutrally for privately placed issues and 
Over-the-Counter (OTC), such as Rule 144a and ADR Level 1. 
2.4 Cross listing and risk reduction  
With the benefit of market efficiency from the information environment, firms that cross listed 
operate in an open and transparent way so that any threats to shareholders will be identified 
promptly and eliminated in a timely fashion. Internally, with a low risk of default and low 
probability of breach of duty by controlling shareholders, this lowers the cost of capital. 
Externally, the investors’ base is enlarged to absorb more risks due to their diverse risk aversions 
and its sharing effect also helps reduce cost of capital. As Karolyi (1998) further asserts, 
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reduction in risk locally is more than enough to offset the increase in risk worldwide. 
Equivalently, Errunza and Miller (2000) verify a considerable decline in the post-listing cost of 
financing, which will inversely increase the net present value of growth opportunities and reckon 
it as part of market liberalization. 
Barry and Brown (1985) assert that the cost of capital relates to the deviation of forecasting to its 
fair value in equilibrium pricing model. Abidance of firms by laws in cross-border market ensure 
that they will accept inquires and questions from the public and this way of communication 
brings down estimation bias, leading to a lower financing cost. Gebhardt et al. (2001) certify the 
inverse relationship between required rates of return with volatility in the earnings estimation, 
which will decrease as firms become more transparent to the public at large. 
However, consistent disclosure doesn’t necessarily lead to a decline in the cost of capital if fake 
information is announced to manipulate the market on purpose or the firm that is cross listing is 
already followed by many analysts and its transparency level has reached the market standard 
(Botosan, 1997). 
2.5 Cross listing and Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX)  
The enforcement of Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002 has led to a deep transformation in 
financial markets. The collateral damage of this Act has been compelling many firms to 
reconsider their listing decisions and revoke their status in cross-border marketplace, especially 
in exchanges where the compliance costs with Section 404 are unbearable (Berger et al., 2005). 
Specifically, delisting is highly associated with firms in good governance shape (Chaplinsky and 
Ramchand, 2008).  
9 
 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act put an end to some human-caused errors in firms’ financial reporting 
and represents to some observers as a policy with additional constraints. This has been used as 
the reason for many firms to delist and deregister in U.S. exchanges compared say to the London 
exchange. However, according to the research of Doidge et al. (2009), shifts of attributes in 
enterprises, rather than the attributes in exchanges, can explain the reduction in numbers of 
listings in U.S. market. However, the U.S. premium still persists for years with statistical 
significance.  
2.6 Cross listing and growth opportunity 
Growth opportunities can be primary inducements for external financing and then seeking a 
cross listing for the purpose of future expansion (Doidge et al., 2004).  Ceteris paribus, the 
balance between gains and costs of cross-border listing can decide the net effect of cross listing 
and the major source of cross listing gains are derived from starting new projects. In other words, 
net gains of cross-border listings are profound for booming firms subject to underdeveloped 
capital markets and constrained by domestic financing difficulties. 
Foerster and Karolyi (1999) and Miller (1999) conducted event studies for ADR listing and 
confirmed positive cumulative abnormal returns concomitantly. Nonetheless, there are firms 
underperforming their local benchmarks in a long horizon based on a study of Foerster and 
Karolyi (2000). Doidge et al. (2004) use Tobin’s Q as an approximation of firm value in the 
American market and find that cross-listing firms are worth more than non-listed peers by 16.5% 
on average, while exchange listing even augments this disparity.   
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2.7 Cross listing and market regulation  
La Porta et al. (2000) show that equity valuation is associated with the efficiency of containing 
embezzlement of private benefits within a tolerable level and law system, not bank-centered 
system, has to maintain sound and thorough as support. Valuable firms could end up with selling 
trash stocks if investors are too insecure to accept stocks in their fair value. Reversely, Lins et al. 
(2000) document that cross-border listing is a strategy for firms to escape from deficient local 
markets where stocks undervaluation is a universal phenomenon.  
The measures adopted in previous literatures to distinguish different regulatory environments 
include subjective variables, for example, a series of cardinal numbers showing self-evaluation 
by investors (La Porta et al., 2000); and objective variables, for example, dummy variables 
indicating various origin of legal system existing in their home countries . It is evident that the 









Chapter 3: Proposed Model 
3.1 Objective of study 
This study aims at finding the relationship between cross listing premium and the default risk of 
firms before their cross listing started. The appreciation in firm value after cross listing, in U.S. 
market, is related to many factors, such as firm-specific, industry-specific and country-specific 
factors. Previous studies usually include growth in sales and firm size as firm-specific factors. 
However, default risk, reflected by the corporate financing structure of firms back in their home 
countries, play a role in the firm value after cross listing as well. The model employed in this 
study will verify its part quantitatively and test its statistical significance. 
3.2 Previous Methodologies  
Previous studies mostly applied cross-section analysis, by treating target factors as fixed effects 
or random effects, using panel data. They would use dummy variables and its interaction terms 
to control the particular time point, usually the year that the cross listing happened. With 
independent variables covering financial/accounting indicators, growth opportunities, 
country/firm-specific factors, estimates of slope parameters show the degree of its influence, 
positive/negative relationship and its statistical significance.  
In the study of Doidge (2004) about private benefits and cross listing in the dual-class firms, a 
panel data set of 745 non-U.S. firms of 20 countries, from 1994 to 2001, were selected, The 
private benefits are measured by the voting premium (Lease et al., 1983; Zingales, 1994), which 
are then regressed on variables measuring both firm and country characteristics and dummy 
variables representing different types of ADR listing. OLS regression model, random effect 
model and fixed effect model are both applied, with Hausman test and Newey-West standard 
error employed for model optimization (Zingales, 1994).  However, the primary weakness 
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inherent in the dual-class approach is the sample selection bias that controllers of firm enjoy a 
considerable proportion of cash flow profits, apart from their executive authority (DeAngelo and 
DeAngelo, 1985). 
In the study of Lang et al. (2003) about information environment and market value, they use data 
of 4859 firms from 28 countries based on I/B/E/S and Worldscope for the 11
th
 month of the year. 
They apply time series analysis to identity the environment changes around cross-listing and 
construct a post-ADR dummy variable to signify the year of cross-issue within six-year window 
period. The results were consistent with the conclusion of Baker et al. (2002): visibility of cross-
listed firms is enhanced by public followings. In addition, Lang uses Tobin’s Q as proxy for firm 
value and regress it on both forecast accuracy and number of analysts to test the significant 
explanatory relationship, based on the sample of 5539 firms. 
In the study of Lins et al. (2000) concerning cross listing on U.S. market and capital constraints, 
they define a variable called “Investment to Cash Flow” and identify the decline in its slope 
coefficient, after the FHP methodology (Fazzari et al., 1988) is applied. The second test of their 
study is to check annual reports expressing worries about external capital. In their third set of 
tests, it shows firms increase equity issuing after an ADR listing. Their study shows that firms 
from developing countries are restricted to fund insufficiency compared to U.S. firms and the 
returns from cross listing are hence more conspicuous.  
In the study of Doidge (et al., 2004) about up-valuation of foreign firms listed in the U.S, they 
obtain data of 1167 firms cross listed in the U.S. from Worldscope, Bank of New York, NYSE, 
NASDAQ and OTCCB, etc. Tobin’s Q is used as valuation measure in the study and three 
country-level variables obtained from La Porta (et al., 1998), as well as several traditional 
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country variables, are used for control. The subtleties of their test is the application of  individual 
dummy variables, such as Cross-list, 144a, OTC and Exchange, and interaction dummy 
variables, such as AD*CL, Capital*Exchange, and SG*AD*CL, among which cross listing 
premium exists and persists regardless of whichever models, OLS, 2SLS or Heckman (1979) 
Correction models, are used.  
3.3 My suggestion for methodology 
Among all the works expounding the cross listing premium, the work of Doidge (et al., 2004) 
remains the authority. However, there are some shortcomings about the methodology they 
applied. As indicated by the authors themselves, there exists a selection bias that firms with 
higher Tobin’s Q are selected by chance from countries or industries highly valued generally. 
Additionally, stock market booms in U.S. in the 1990s contribute to stock appreciation, 
irrelevant to cross listing (Doidge et al., 2004).  
To address the subject of cross listing with default probability, the method employed in this 
study follows the work of Sarkissian and Schill (2010).  Their studies examine the universality, 
not the peculiarity, of cross listing premium by also checking U.S. firms cross listed in non-U.S. 
markets and non-U.S. firms cross listed in non-U.S. markets. Compared with the influence of 
regulation system, the pre-listing value premium, indicated by Q (-2) in their regression, shows 
markedly pertinence in explaining post-listing premium.  
In this paper, the measure of firms’ pre-listing behaviors is captured by their pre-listing premium 
exactly one year before their announcement date of cross-listing. Market efficiency theory 
asserts that semi-strong market would absorb news quickly and efficiently as long as they are 
made public, i.e. official announcement of firms. This explains the reason why the 
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announcement date of cross-listing, not the actual date of cross-listing, accounts for the dividing 
timeline between pre-listing and post-listing.  
Consistent with the work of Bharath and Shumway (2008), the concept of Black-Scholes-Merton 
model for option pricing can be used to capture the valuation of equity and the concept of Value 
at Risk can be used to measure the probability that firm value is less than their liabilities, i.e. firm 
defaults. Apart from the classic Merton Distance to Default model verified in their research, the 
naïve Model introduced also shows statistical significance in out-of-sample forecasting of CDS 
spread regression and bond yield spread regression. This may result from the similar functional 
formula and same basic inputs of these two models and hence high correlation between default 
probabilities they produce. Therefore, the default probability measure used in this paper would 
be based on the naïve model to avoid the numerical iteration process.  
3.4 Model Introduction 
3.4.1 Model 
Based on the model used by Sarkissian and Schill (2010), this study will continue to include firm 
specific variables to characteristics, such as growth opportunity and firm size. Besides, another 
variable indicating the default probability (Bharath and Shumway, 2008) of firms before they 
started cross listing is also taken into consideration. What’s more, Tobin’s Q is applied in this 
model to measure premium in firm value both before and after their cross-listing activities. 
Cross-sectional methodology is used to differentiate the sector specific effect and will replace the 
variable called           , introduced by Sarkissian and Schill (2010). 
                                                                      
                   
The adjustment made in this model to its original version generates extra benefits. Firstly, the 
sample for regression analysis are all Canadian firms that cross-listed their stocks in the U.S. 
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market, and this eliminates the country differences in both home markets and foreign markets, as 
well as the differences in regulation environment and legal systems. Secondly, in order to 
distinguish multiple sectors that these firms belong to, the cross-sectional data are applied in both 
Fixed and Random effects models. This alternative method avoids the problem of choosing the 
proper sector variable measuring the general states of each sector in the specific time of listing 
announcement. Thirdly, the application of the naïve model to get corporate default probability 
reduces numerical process, but also provides with accurate results compared with that from the 
more complicated Merton DD model. 
3.4.2 Variables 
Although the concept of Tobin’s Q used in measuring cross listing premium in stock valuation is 
different from the one introduced by Tobin and Brainard (1968), the pervasive usage of Tobin’s 
Q is due to its advantage that it captures the value of firms’ intangible assets in the market value 
of equity.  Besides, since the market value of equity is considered as the present value of future 
cash flows, Tobin’s Q possesses the perceptiveness in evaluating the future equity value of the 
firm (Sarkissian and Schill, 2010). 
The following shows the established practice in measuring stock premium: 
         
                                                             
                 
 
            : measured as the Tobin’s Q based on the inputs just after the announcement date of 
cross-listing. 
             : measured as a geometric growth rate in sales per share for the latest six months 
before announcement of cross-listing. 
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                : measured as the natural logarithm of the firms’ net sales, which represent the 
size effects. Net sales reflect accurately the actual sales generated by firms by deducting the 
returns by customers, allowance for damaged or missing goods, and any discount from the gross 
sales. 
                  : measured as the Tobin’s Q based on the inputs exactly one year prior to the 
announcement date of cross-listing. 
            : measured by approximating the market value of firm’s debt with its face value and 
approximating the total volatility of the firm is calculated as follows: 
        
 
   
   
 
   
            
After approximating the expected return on the firm’s assets with stock’s return over the 
previous period, the “naïve distance to default” is calculated as follows:  
        
  [       ]                   
    
        √ 
 
Then, the default probability is defined as:                      
The value of equity and debt is measured at their market values just before the announcement 
date of cross-listing.      is measured as the stock return in the last period just before the 
announcement date of cross-listing.    is measured as the standard deviation of stock return for 
the last three years prior to the announcement date of cross-listing. 
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Chapter 4: Regression Analysis 
4.1 Source of Data  
The sample of Canadian firms is based on the data used by Roosenboom and van Dijk (2009) in 
their research: “The Market Reaction to Cross-Listings: Does the Destination Market Matter?” 
Since this present study only considers cross-listing of Canadian firms in NYSE or NASDAQ, 
54 firms are targeted who announced their cross-listing during the period of 1982 to 2002.  After 
collecting financial data from Datastream 5.0, 7 firms with incomplete data are eliminated, 
leaving 47 valid samples from 10 sectors and 38 industries. 
Figure 4.1 
 
According to the declaration about data sources by Roosenboom and van Dijk (2009), the 
survivorship bias is fully considered by including firms that announced their cross-listing during 
the target period but already delisted after 2002. Besides, issues of common shares, GDRs and 
ADRs cross border are all taken into consideration as long as their announcement dates are 
reliable from various sources and their stock price data 250 days prior to their announcement can 
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4.2 Regression Results 
4.2.1 Pooled OLS Regression 
Table 4.1 
 
The Pooled OLS Regression ignores sector specific effects to which those Canadian firms 
belong. Generally, the adequacy of model is decent as shown in the R-square and adjusted-R 
square, both up to 80%. Besides, size effect and pre-listing premium are both statistically 
significant, indicating that large firms already with higher market valuations are more likely to 
gain higher appreciation in stock value after their listing cross-border. As for the measure of 
default probability, its negative slope coefficient indicates that post-listing premium is more 
related to firms with lower default risk in their home countries. However, this relationship is not 
statistically significant.   
4.2.2 Fixed Effects Within-Group Regression 
The Fixed Effect Model reckons sector specific effects as the same within each sector but 
different among all the ten sectors. The advantage of using this model, compared with the Pooled 
OLS Model, is that firms are compared and analysed within their own sectors to measure some 
particular phenomenon accounting for stock premium but hard to be embodied as one 
                                                                              
       _cons    -.1788727   .0956347    -1.87   0.070    -.3730214     .015276
    naiveEDF    -.0689295   .0451929    -1.53   0.136    -.1606759    .0228169
       pre_q      .751976   .0728033    10.33   0.000     .6041773    .8997746
 size_effect     .0199947   .0076849     2.60   0.014     .0043934     .035596
  growthrate     .1158391   .1522517     0.76   0.452    -.1932483    .4249264
                                                                              
      post_q        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    1.43123071    39  .036698223           Root MSE      =  .08633
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.7969
    Residual    .260856418    35  .007453041           R-squared     =  0.8177
       Model    1.17037429     4  .292593573           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  4,    35) =   39.26
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      40
. reg post_q growthrate size_effect pre_q naiveEDF
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independent variable. Specifically, stocks in some sectors are higher valued compared with 
similar firms in different sectors. If these effects are particularly related to sectors, rather than 
randomly, the application of the Fixed Effect Model will capture them properly.  
Table 4.2 
 
As shown in the Table 4.2, a pre-listing premium retains its significance while other variables are 
all insignificant. Besides, their coefficients still show a reasonable relationship with post-listing 
premium. That is to say, large firms with high growth rates and low default risks in domestic 
countries are more likely to enjoy higher cross-listing premium in foreign countries. The 
statistical significance of growth rate improves markedly from 45.2% to around 10%, 
demonstrating that growth rates within each sector are similar and stay comparable. However, 
default probabilities of firms seem irrelevant to whatever sector they belong to, manifesting that 
insolvency riskiness has no significant generality within sectors.   
F test that all u_i=0:     F(9, 26) =     1.57               Prob > F = 0.1778
                                                                              
         rho    .34391071   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e     .0806597
     sigma_u      .058398
                                                                              
       _cons    -.1029507    .103974    -0.99   0.331    -.3166724    .1107709
    naiveEDF    -.0558614   .0506248    -1.10   0.280    -.1599221    .0481994
       pre_q     .7868808   .0853373     9.22   0.000     .6114674    .9622942
 size_effect     .0125579   .0084747     1.48   0.150    -.0048621     .029978
  growthrate     .2779482   .1633023     1.70   0.101    -.0577245    .6136209
                                                                              
      post_q        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.0507                        Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(4,26)            =     26.12
       overall = 0.8085                                        max =        10
       between = 0.7920                                        avg =       4.0
R-sq:  within  = 0.8007                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: groupindic~r                    Number of groups   =        10
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =        40
. xtreg post_q growthrate size_effect pre_q naiveEDF, fe
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The F-statistic is relatively small compared with the corresponding critical value, and 
demonstrates that the fixed effect in this sample is not strong and obvious.  
4.2.3 Random Effects GLS Regression 
The Random Effect Model considers the sector specific effect as the random variable irrelevant 
to any sectors. The advantage of using this model, compared with the Pooled OLS Model, is that 
the sector effect is not completely ignored as error term but specifically treated as the random 
part of the error term also influencing the dependent variable. The Random Effect Model 
assumes that some stocks are overvalued while others are undervalued in all of the ten sectors 
and the stock premium is not a universal phenomenon is any sectors. This suggests that stock 
value may not be recognized even in the most promising industries and vice versa. 
Table 4.3 
 
As shown in the Table 4.3, pre-listing premium and size effect show their statistical significance 
indicating that large firms with higher pre-listing valuation in their home countries will have a 
                                                                              
         rho    .09967438   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e     .0806597
     sigma_u     .0268379
                                                                              
       _cons    -.1589729   .0951345    -1.67   0.095    -.3454331    .0274874
    naiveEDF    -.0610268   .0447959    -1.36   0.173    -.1488251    .0267716
       pre_q     .7627245   .0740354    10.30   0.000     .6176179    .9078312
 size_effect     .0177268    .007729     2.29   0.022     .0025781    .0328754
  growthrate     .1521005    .150881     1.01   0.313    -.1436209    .4478219
                                                                              
      post_q        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, X)   = 0 (assumed)                    Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(4)       =    149.93
       overall = 0.8169                                        max =        10
       between = 0.8185                                        avg =       4.0
R-sq:  within  = 0.7949                         Obs per group: min =         1
Group variable: groupindic~r                    Number of groups   =        10
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =        40
. xtreg post_q growthrate size_effect pre_q naiveEDF, re
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higher post-listing premium. Besides, coefficients of growth rate and naiveEDF also verify the 
relationship between these two variables and post-listing premium as tested previously. 
However, the considerable improvement in P-value of size effect and naiveEDF manifest that 
firm size and their default probability are various within and between sectors. It shows that large 
firms with low default risk will gain higher stock valuation after cross-listing, regardless of 
which sector they belong to. 
Table 4.4 
 
The Lagrangian-Multiplier (LM) test for random effect model (Table 4.4) indicates that the 
random error term is not significant and thus the random effects among all ten sectors are not 
strong.  
4.2.4 Hausman Test for Fixed or Random Effects 
The individual tests for fixed effect and random effect show that both methods are not superior to 
the other, due to the fact that sector effect does not show particular properties fixedly or 
randomly. The Hausman Test is conducted to give preference between these two models.  
 
                          Prob > chibar2 =   0.3507
                             chibar2(01) =     0.15
        Test:   Var(u) = 0
                       u     .0007203       .0268379
                       e      .006506       .0806597
                  post_q     .0366982       .1915678
                                                       
                                 Var     sd = sqrt(Var)
        Estimated results:
        post_q[groupindicator,t] = Xb + u[groupindicator] + e[groupindicator,t]






As shown in the test results in Table 4.5, the Hausman Test Statistic is only 4.1, which is way 
smaller than its corresponding critical values at the significance level of 10%, 5% and 1%. It 
indicates that random effect model is preferred even though the sector effect is not entirely 
random among all the ten sectors. It demonstrates that sector has no definite influence on the 
stock premium after their cross-border listing in foreign countries. Firm valuation is more related 
to firm specific factors than sector/industry factors. 
4.3 Interpretation of Results 
Based on the Random Effect Model: 
                                                                       
                                                      
Note: 
    is treated as random variable measuring sector premium among all ten sectors. 
The coefficient of                 is significant at 5% level. 
                Prob>chi2 =      0.3930
                          =        4.10
                  chi2(4) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
    naiveEDF     -.0558614    -.0610268        .0051654        .0251035
       pre_q      .7868808     .7627245        .0241563        .0447584
 size_effect      .0125579     .0177268       -.0051688        .0037796
  growthrate      .2779482     .1521005        .1258477        .0688615
                                                                              
                   fixed        random       Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
. hausman fixed random, sigmaless
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The coefficient of                   is significant at 1% level. 
The regression result shows that large firms with higher growth opportunities, higher stock 
valuations and lower default risks before their announcement of cross-listing activities will gain 
a higher stock premium in foreign capital market after they accomplish the stock listing cross-
border.  
Since the sector effect is already incorporated structurally in the regression model, the remaining 
explanatory variables are all related to firm specific factors concerning firms’ growth 
opportunity, scale of business, stock valuation nationally and risk management for default in 
existence. Specifically, the firm size and pre-listing premium are more significant in influencing 
the post-listing premium of stocks, indicating that foreign investors will prefer to invest in large 
firm with already high market recognition in their home countries.  
The coefficient of naiveEDF is negative 0.061, showing that an increase in default probability by 
one percentage point would decrease the post-listing premium by 0.061 percentage points. 
Although this variable is not statistically significant, it shows a negative relationship with stock 
premium and indicates that good financial state, i.e. low default probability, would increase stock 
premium in foreign countries. Obviously, foreign investors would choose to provide capital for 
firms with a good history of low default risk. Even though Canadian firms have to reach the 
similar standards to sell their stocks internationally, firms with high creditability financially will 
be recognized easily in a foreign market and thus get more capital support for their stocks, 
resulting in a higher market valuation and higher post-listing premium.  
4.4 Feasibility of Model 






As shown in the correlation coefficient matrix (Table 4.6), the correlations between explanatory 
variables are low, with the maximum level to 35.67%. So, there is no obvious correlation 
problem with the independent variables in the regression model.  
4.4.2 Heteroscedasticity Test—White Test 
Varying volatility is common for cross-sectional data, which necessities the White test for 
Heteroscedasticity and the use Heteroscedasticity-Consistent Standard Error for further analysis. 
Table 4.7 
 
       pre_q     0.0392   0.0489   0.3567   1.0000
 size_effect     0.0126   0.2496   1.0000
  growthrate     0.0526   1.0000
    naiveEDF     1.0000
                                                  
               naiveEDF growth~e size_e~t    pre_q
(obs=40)
. correlate naiveEDF growthrate size_effect pre_q
                                                   
               Total        32.80     19    0.0254
                                                   
            Kurtosis         0.01      1    0.9028
            Skewness        11.63      4    0.0204
  Heteroskedasticity        21.15     14    0.0978
                                                   
              Source         chi2     df      p
                                                   
Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test
         Prob > chi2  =    0.0978
         chi2(14)     =     21.15
         against Ha: unrestricted heteroskedasticity
White's test for Ho: homoskedasticity
. estat imtest, white
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The White test above shows that Heteroscedasticity exists in sample data since null hypothesis is 
easily rejected when          (Table 4.7). This result indicates that simple OLS regression is 
not proper to capture the characteristics of sample data.  
Table 4.8 
 
As shown in the robust regression, three variables, i.e. size effect, pre-listing premium and 
naiveEDF are all significant at the level of 5%, 1% and 10%, respectively (Table 4.8).  
Compared with both Pooled OLS Model and Random Effect Model, the Heteroscedasticity-
Consistent Model dramatically improves the significance of the variable called naiveEDF. The 
mechanism of using Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors in replace of actual various 
standard errors is an efficient remedy, but lack practical economic sense. And it also pooled all 
the sample firms together without differentiating sectors in which they are individually involved. 
Conclusively, although the results from Heteroscedasticity-consistent Model looks superior to 
those of Random Effect Model, analysis in this paper is still based on the Random Effect Model 
to capture the cross-sectional effects among diversified sectors.  
                                                                              
       _cons    -.1788727   .0910313    -1.96   0.057     -.363676    .0059306
    naiveEDF    -.0689295   .0399171    -1.73   0.093    -.1499656    .0121066
       pre_q      .751976   .1046587     7.19   0.000     .5395076    .9644444
 size_effect     .0199947   .0080466     2.48   0.018     .0036593    .0363301
  growthrate     .1158391   .1299412     0.89   0.379    -.1479555    .3796336
                                                                              
      post_q        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                                       Root MSE      =  .08633
                                                       R-squared     =  0.8177
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  4,    35) =   28.03
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =      40
. reg post_q growthrate size_effect pre_q naiveEDF, vce(robust)
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4.4.3 Specification Test—Remsey’s Reset Test 
                                                                      
                                                          
Table 4.9 
 
   
   




       
     ⁄
 
               
 ⁄
          
  ⁄
        
The F test shows no specification error because that F-statistic is less than its corresponding 




                                                                              
       _cons     .0106129   .1759705     0.06   0.952    -.3478273     .369053
yhat_quartic     5.251676   7.099535     0.74   0.465    -9.209604    19.71296
  yhat_cubic    -6.280984   10.39559    -0.60   0.550    -27.45611    14.89414
 yhat_square     2.575312   4.706143     0.55   0.588    -7.010788    12.16141
    naiveEDF    -.0488836   .0624266    -0.78   0.439    -.1760425    .0782752
       pre_q     .2245741   .6049986     0.37   0.713    -1.007768    1.456916
 size_effect     .0082453   .0158428     0.52   0.606    -.0240253    .0405159
  growthrate     .1581029   .1504535     1.05   0.301    -.1483609    .4645666
                                                                              
      post_q        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    1.43123071    39  .036698223           Root MSE      =  .07561
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.8442
    Residual    .182949385    32  .005717168           R-squared     =  0.8722
       Model    1.24828133     7  .178325904           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  7,    32) =   31.19
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      40
> uartic
. reg post_q growthrate size_effect pre_q naiveEDF yhat_square yhat_cubic yhat_q
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Chapter 5 Conclusions, Limitations and Recommendations 
5.1 Conclusions 
This paper aims at verifying the relationship between post-listing premium and firms’ default 
probability before the announcement of cross-listing. By using 47 firms in the sample from ten 
sectors in the Canadian market, and collecting their financial data before and after firms’ official 
announcement date of cross-listing in the U.S. market, firms’ post-listing premium are properly 
measured by Tobin’s Q ratio and then regressed on several firm specific variables. In addition to 
the target variable measuring default risk in the domestic market, other factors that have potential 
in influencing stock valuation in the NYSE or NASDAQ are all incorporated as explanatory 
variables, such as growth rate, firm size and pre-listing premium. Since sector specific factors are 
hard to identify and measure properly, they are included in the structure of the model rather than 
as variables. The preferences of Random Effect Model to Fixed Effect Model supports that 
sector specific factor share no definite influence on the stock valuation of firms in various 
sectors. 
Among all these regression models, pre-listing premium and size-effect possess statistical 
significance in explaining the post-listing premium in U.S. market while the naiveEDF 
measuring the firm default probability only shows its high statistical relevance in the 
Heteroscedasticity-Consistent model. Firstly, it indicates that default riskiness of firms have firm 
individuality rather than sector universality based on all the sample firms in ten sectors. Since the 
Heteroscedasticity phenomenon is general in cross-sectional data, simply treating data with its 
remedy approach would provide surprising results. Secondly, it demonstrates that default 
probability of cross-listed firms may not be seriously taken into consideration by foreign 
investors in deciding whether they should buy the newly cross-listed stocks or not. Possibly, 
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probabilities of default are so complicated to measure properly that investors will choose to 
ignore them when investing newly cross-listed firms just for short-term investment. Or, the 
survivorship of those cross-listing firms hoodwink part of those investors who have no expertise 
in analysing firm valuation and in figuring out what is the real internal financial state. However, 
the negative coefficient of naiveEDF manifests that high default risk would inversely influence 
the stock premium in foreign capital markets, which is tested in all the regression models applied 
and also has its economic sense. 
5.2 Limitations 
Firstly, from the perspective of data collection, this study is based on a small sample of Canadian 
firms cross-listed in the U.S. market from 1982 to 2002. These samples are randomly selected 
without any preference to any sectors or industries. The only constraint relating to selection 
process is the availability of their official announcement data of cross-listing from whatever 
sources. In accordance with the announcement date, all the financial data before and after the 
announcement date are hand-collected from Datastream, which is so time-consuming that the 
analysis has to be narrowed down to only 47 Canadian firms with time ending to 2002. As for 
the sectors of Media and Utilities, only one firm is left for each of the sector and is clearly not 
fully representative of all information in that sector. However, as a matter of fact, the regression 
results show no markedly differences by excluding these two firms and two sectors.  
Secondly, the superiority of using Fixed / Random Effect Model to measure sector specific 
factors, compared with Pooled OLS Model, is that it considers cross-sectional effect rather than 
ignoring it. But the regression result by the Random Effect Model is inferior to the 
Heteroscedasticity-Consistent Model.  It simply treats all the difference in volatility as selection 
biases, not sector specific. Although the Random Effects Model has more economic sense, this 
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approach may mistakenly consider sector specific factor as the entire “random” part of the error 
term under assumptions in cross-sectional models. The truth is, there are other factors 
incorporated in the error term in addition to sector factor. 
Thirdly, the variable used as measure of default probability is called naiveEDF. As its name 
indicated, this probability is calculated in a simplified approach based on a lot of assumptions 
about market value of debt and volatility of total asset. The feasibility of using this measure 
rather than the actual probability measure based on BSM model and iteration process is on the 
basis of the conclusion in the work of Bharath, and Shumway (2008). However, this measure 
may lose its degree of accuracy in other test environment on different dataset. 
5.3 Recommendations 
In view of three limitations mentioned above in this paper, the corresponding recommendations 
are proposed for further study: 
A larger dataset should be included in the analysis chapter, which may contain more firms from 
different sectors with a longer time span. Additionally, firms from other domestic countries who 
cross-listed their stocks in other major capital markets can also be incorporated in the study to 
test whether this causality relationship is related to origination / destination markets. With more 
comprehensive samples to analyze, the regression results will be more accurate and the 
conclusions more credible. 
Besides, in order to accurately capture the sector specific effect to which these sample firms 
belong to, two alternative methods can be used rather than adopting different model formats. 
Following previous academic work, the Industry Tobin’s Q is applied to measure the average 
level of firm valuation in the overall industry, which can approximate industry effect to stock 
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valuation. Otherwise, the general equity index for each industry can be identified and be traced 
for its historical performance in the exact time when firms published their cross-listing news 
officially. Both methods require extensive collection of massive data. 
What’s more, I would suggest using the BSM method and iteration process to get the actual 
default probability rather than based on its simplified version in approximation. The complicated 
calculation process and rigorous mathematical demonstration would improve the veracity in 
measuring default probability and thus increase precision of regression test. Otherwise, standard 
indicators for insolvency from authorities, for example credit rating agencies, can be used to 
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Firm Name  Sector Industry 
AETERNA LABS. Healthcare Biotechnology 
AGNICO-EAGLE MNS. Basic Materials Gold 
AGRIUM Basic Materials Agricultural Chemicals 
ALBERTA ENERGY DEAD - 
MERGER 916229 - TOT 
RETURNIND Basic Materials Oil & Gas 
ALL.ATLANTIS COMMS.'A' 
VTG.SHS. Technology Computer software 
ANGIOTECH PHARMS. Health Care Pharmaceuticals 
ATI TECHNOLOGIES Industrial Goods Metal Fabrication 
AXCAN PHARMA Health Care Pharmaceuticals 
BALLARD PWR.SYS. Industrial Goods 
Industrial Electrical 
Equipment 
BANK OF MONTREAL QUE. Financial  Money Center Banks 
BIOVAIL health care pharmacy 
BROOKFIELD PROPS. Financials Real Estate Development 
CAMECO Basic Materials Industrial Metal & Minerals 
CANWEST GLOBAL 
COMMUNICATIONS CORP Media Broadcasting 
CGI GP.'A' Industrial Goods Trucking 
CRYPTOLOGIC Technology Internet software services 
DATAMIRROR Technology Application Software 
DESCARTES SYS.GP. Technology Enterprise Software 
DOREL INDS.'A' 
Consumer 
Discretionary Home Furnishings 
ENBRIDGE Basic Materials Oil & Gas pipelines 
EXTENDICARE 'A' Healthcare Health Care Plans 
FOUR SEASONS HTLS.VTG. SHS. 
Consumer 
discretionary 
Hotels Resorts and Cruise 
Lines 
GILDAN ACTIVEWEAR 
SBVTG.'A' Consumer goods textile 




Hotels Resorts and Cruise 
Lines 
IPSCO Basic Materials Steel 
IVANHOE EN. Energy Oil & Gas 
KINGSWAY FINL.SVS. Financials 
Property & causality 
insurance 
MDS Health care Health Care Technology 
NEXEN Energy Oil & Gas 
NORANDA Basic Materials Aluminum 
PAN AMER.SILV. Basic Materials Silver Mining 
PETRO CANADA Energy Integrated Oil and Gas 
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PRECISION DRILLING Basic Materials Oil & Gas 
RESEARCH IN MOTION Technology Phones & Handheld devices 
ROGERS COMMS.'A' Technology Wireless Communication 
ROYAL BANK CANADA Financials Banks 
SHAW COMMS.'B' 
Consumer 
Discretionary Cable and Satellite 
SIERRA WIRELESS Technology communication net working 
SUNCOR ENERGY Basic Materials Oil & Gas 








TESCO Basic Materials oil gas equipment services 
TLC VIS. Health care Health care facilities 
TRANSALTA Utilities Diversified utilities 
WESTAIM Financials Asset Management 
 
 
 
